Grief often diminishes quickly, even though the dead continue to matter to us; anger often evaporates, even though the injustice to which it responds remains undiminished. Nonetheless, such accommodation seems sometimes acceptable: it would be a mistake to be persistently grieving or to be relentlessly angry. But how could it be acceptable, if the reasons for grief and anger remain significant?
I argue that the puzzle of accommodation is recalcitrant, because its source lies in a structural feature of consciousness: Since grief and anger are not about us, our apprehension of their temporal structure is at odds with our apprehension of the object of the emotion. This gives rise to irreconcilable double-vision.
Nonetheless, accommodation can be reasonable. However, we can only understand this from a theoretical standpoint on ourselves. From such a standpoint, we can understand that, given the role of the emotions in our lives, it is all right that we should accommodate ourselves to loss. Yet we cannot point to the reasons in light of which this would be all right. Reflection on the temporality of the emotions must leave us unreconciled.
"I am Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. Before coming to Edinburgh, I taught at Brandeis University for 13 years.
My main research interests are in philosophy of mind, ethics, and epistemology, as well as in existentialism and the history of late modern philosophy. I received my Ph.D. from U.C. Berkeley in 2007 and my A.B. from Harvard University in 2001.
You can find out more about me (including my favorite condiment) in my interview for the Blog of the APA."
LOCATION:Emerson Hall, Room 305 STATUS:CONFIRMED DTSTART:20220909T180000Z DTEND:20220909T200000Z END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR