Abstract: To call someone ignorant is to insult them. It is not surprising then that much of the philosophical literature on ignorance has focused on its harms. In this paper, I argue that there are morally laudable cases of ignorance qua ignorance. Ignorance, as a kind of epistemic etiquette, protects inquiry from turning into an inquisition, questioning from turning into prying. When we indulge in overcuriosity we risk a range of inquisitive wrongs, we risk failing to give others the respect they are owed not just in how we act towards them, but also in how they figure in our inquiries. Two complications arise, however, in determining how to understand ignorance as epistemic etiquette. First, many examples of hermeneutical injustice rely on the disadvantaged not questioning the status quo, of not being curious. Second, to determine whether one should be ignorant about p may require inquiring into p in the first place. Despite these challenges, I posit epistemic etiquette as a promising resource for distinguishing one class of morally permissible ignorance.
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