Research Interests: Metaethics, Moral Psychology, History of Ethics, Normative Ethics, Philosophy of Action
Dissertation Title: Practical Cognitivism: An Essay on the Nature of Normative Judgment
My dissertation argues that the key insights that have animated the so-called “non-cognitivist” tradition have been distorted and obscured through attempts to express them in a theoretical framework that cannot accommodate them. When properly understood, these ideas point towards a distinctive kind of metaethical view that I call practical cognitivism. This view understands ethical practice as the product of a distinctively practical kind of cognition, which we engage in by adopting, revising, rejecting, and carrying out practical commitments. Understanding ethical practice in this way allows us to place ethics in the natural world without distorting or undermining it; it sheds light on normative guidance and akrasia; and it allows us to make sense of ethical reflection and understanding without turning ethical inquiry into something else.