

MICHA GLAESER

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EDUCATION

* anticipated

Harvard University, Ph.D. Philosophy*	09/2006 - 05/2016
University of California, Berkeley, visiting student	08/2004 - 05/2005
University of Bayreuth, Germany, B.A. Philosophy & Economics	10/2002 - 05/2006

RESEARCH AND TEACHING

AOS: ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of law
AOC: applied ethics (public policy, human rights, business ethics)

DISSERTATION

“Counsel and Command: A Relational Account of Authority”
Advisors: Christine M. Korsgaard (*chair*), Thomas M. Scanlon, Selim Berker

PRESENTATIONS

* invited

“Two Distinctions in Authority” (University of Arizona)*	11/2014
“Two Distinctions in Authority” (Yale Working Group in Moral Philosophy)*	11/2014
“Two Distinctions in Authority” (Harvard Graduate Legal Philosophy Colloquium)	11/2014
“What Is Choice Sensitivity? A Dilemma for Luck Egalitarianism” (University of Bayreuth, Germany)*	11/2013
“What Is Choice Sensitivity? A Dilemma for Luck Egalitarianism” (National University of Singapore)*	10/2013
“The Rawls-Cohen Debate” (American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates)*	05/2013
“(How) Does Morality Depend on Law?” (UCLA Law and Philosophy Graduate Conference)	04/2013
“What Is Justice? An Obituary for the Rawls-Cohen Debate” (Princeton Graduate Conference in Political Theory)	04/2013
“The Problem of Private Reason” (Conference on “Roads to Freedom? Unsolved Questions in Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy,” University of Göttingen, Germany)	07/2012
“Three Themes in the Philosophy of David Gauthier” (Conference on 25th Anniversary of <i>Morals by Agreement</i> , York University, Canada)	05/2011

AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

Harvard University, George Santayana Departmental Fellowship	09/2015 - 01/2016
Institute for Humane Studies, Summer Graduate Research Fellowship	05/2015 - 08/2015
Harvard University, Presidential Dissertation Completion Fellowship	09/2014 - 06/2015
Harvard University, Certificate of Distinction in Teaching	05/2012
Institute for Humane Studies, Humane Studies Fellowship	09/2011 - 06/2016
Harvard University, George Santayana Departmental Fellowship	09/2011 - 01/2012
Harvard University, Edmond J. Safra Graduate Fellowship	09/2010 - 06/2011

Harvard University, Presidential Scholarship	09/2006 - 06/2008
German Academic Exchange Service, fellowship for internship	06/2006 - 07/2006
German Academic Exchange Service, fellowship for senior thesis	03/2006 - 05/2006

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

* primary instructor

Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy*	Spring 2016
Nonconsequentialist Ethical Theory (Frances Kamm)	Spring 2012
<i>The Concept of Law</i> and the Hart-Dworkin Debate*	Spring 2012
John Rawls: <i>Political Liberalism</i> *	Summer 2010
Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality (Matthias Risse, Rory Stewart)	Spring 2010
The Responsibilities of Public Action (Frances Kamm)	Fall 2009
Equality*	Summer 2009
Human Rights: A Philosophical Introduction (Matthias Risse)	Spring 2009
The Responsibilities of Public Action (Frances Kamm)	Fall 2008
Social Contract Theory* (<i>with Jakub Wrzesniewski</i>)	Summer 2008
Logic and Argumentation Theory (Rainer Hegselmann)	Fall 2005

GRADUATE COURSEWORK

* audited

Moral and Political Philosophy

Normative and Meta-Normative Questions (Selim Berker, Derek Parfit)*	Spring 2015
Topics in Political Philosophy (Michael Rosen, Thomas Scanlon)*	Fall 2010
Equality and Democracy (Thomas Scanlon)*	Spring 2010
Philosophy of Action (Christine Korsgaard)*	Spring 2009
Political Philosophy (Philippe Van Parijs)	Spring 2008
Marx and Marxism (Tommie Shelby)	Fall 2007
Practical Reason (Christine Korsgaard, Melissa Barry)	Spring 2007
Contemporary Ethical Theory (Christine Korsgaard, Tamar Shapiro)	Fall 2006

Metaphysics and Epistemology

Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology (Selim Berker)	Fall 2007
First-Year Colloquium: Transcendental Arguments (Cheryl Chen)	Spring 2007
Philosophy of Language (Bernhard Nickel)	Fall 2006
First-Year Colloquium: Induction (Peter Godfrey-Smith)	Fall 2006

History of Philosophy

John Stuart Mill (Richard Tuck)*	Fall 2015
Ancient and Medieval Political Philosophy (Richard Tuck)*	Fall 2015
Karl Marx (Richard Tuck)*	Fall 2015
John Locke (Richard Tuck)*	Spring 2012
Wittgenstein's <i>Tractatus</i> (Warren Goldfarb)*	Spring 2012
Frege, Russell, and the Early Wittgenstein (Warren Goldfarb)*	Fall 2011
Hume's Ethical Theory (Christine Korsgaard)*	Spring 2011
Kant's Practical Philosophy (Christine Korsgaard)*	Fall 2009
Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy (Richard Moran)	Spring 2008
Aristotle's <i>Ethics</i> and <i>Politics</i> (Gisela Striker)	Spring 2007
Kant's <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> (Matthew Boyle)	Spring 2007
British Empiricism (Jeffrey McDonough)	Fall 2006

ACADEMIC SERVICES

Freshman Proctor (“Resident Advisor”), Harvard College	2010 - 2012
Graduate Student Representative, Department of Philosophy	2010 - 2011
Events Organizer, Department of Philosophy	2008 - 2009
Department Representative, Harvard University Graduate Student Council	2007 - 2008
Co-organizer, Harvard-MIT Graduate Student Conference in Philosophy	2007 - 2008

LANGUAGES

German (native), English (fluent), Spanish, French (basic), Latin, Ancient Greek (reading)

REFEREES

Christine M. Korsgaard
Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University
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Thomas M. Scanlon
Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity, Harvard University
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Selim Berker
Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University
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Richard Tuck
Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government, Harvard University
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Frances Kamm (*teaching referee*)
Littauer Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University
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The concept of authority figures in our lives in what seem to be two distinct ways. First, there is the sort of authority we ascribe to those with special knowledge or competence. Second, there is the sort of authority at play between parents and children, the state and its citizens, or in institutional hierarchies or chains of command. In the first case, we speak of someone's "being an authority" in her area of expertise. In the second case, we say that one person "has authority over" another in some domain. Philosophers tend to call the first kind of authority "theoretical" and the second "practical."

What do theoretical and practical authority have in common? How are they distinct? Much theorizing about authority assumes that its normativity is to be understood in non-relational terms, for instance in terms of the reasons that independently apply to the persons involved. Similarly, philosophers often presuppose that the distinction between the two kinds of authority should be conceived of in terms of a difference in their respective subject matter, such as the difference between reasons for belief and reasons for action, again considered independently of the relations in which the relevant persons stand. I defend the view that the concept of authority and the distinction between theoretical and practical authority instead make irreducible reference to the normative relations between the persons in question. I then elaborate on some of the implications of my position for the authority of law and the relation between law and morality.

One prominent non-relational account of authority is Joseph Raz's "service conception," which says that *A* has authority over *B* if and only if *B* does better at complying with her reasons if she treats *A*'s verdicts as "preemptive" than if she tries to comply with those reasons "directly," where "her reasons" refers to the reasons that apply to *B* independently of her relation to *A*. To illustrate, if we have independent reason to, say, provide assistance to the poor, and if a system of tax-based public poverty relief is more effective at assisting the poor than private acts of charity, then the applicable legal code creates a "preemptive reason" for us to pay our taxes and so has authority over us according to the service conception. Preemptive reasons in turn are reasons that exclude certain otherwise applicable reasons from consideration, such as the reasons that govern private charitable activities in our example. In his recent critique of the service conception, Stephen Darwall argues that an instrumental relation between *A*'s verdicts and *B*'s compliance with her reasons of the sort invoked by Raz is not sufficient for *A*'s creating preemptive reasons for *B*. In chapter 1, I argue that Darwall's criticism conflates two distinct senses of "preemption." For Raz, preemption is a matter of the content of the reasons in question. For Darwall, on the other hand, the very possibility of *A*'s creating preemptive reasons for *B* already presupposes *A*'s authority over *B*, and so something irreducibly relational.

The distinction between the two senses of "preemption" is central to my account of authority in chapter 2. I begin by analyzing the different forms of interpersonal address proper to theoretical and practical authority and the different kinds of addressor-addressee relations they presuppose. I call these forms of address "counsel" and "command." Preemption constitutes an internal standard of success for both of them; however, the kind of preemption at play differs between the two forms of address in the way just sketched. To quote Hobbes, the preemptive force of counsel depends on "the matter itself" whereas that of command on "the will of the instructor." The conceptual framework laid out here provides the resources for an interpretation of the idea of natural relational equality between persons on which Kant's political philosophy turns. For Kant, certain forms of moral asymmetry presuppose a particular institutional structure. These asymmetries in turn are understandable in terms of the form of address proper to them. For instance, "Get off my lawn!" is a case of command and as such depends for its validity or "felicitousness" on the existence of a regime of private property, which in turn makes possible the moral asymmetry between addressor and addressee with respect to the addressor's lawn.

However, other instances of command do not appear to presuppose any such structure for their validity. “Get off my foot!” for instance seems to be a case in point. Note that this sort of case is precisely what troubles R. Jay Wallace, Douglas Lavin, and others about Darwall’s “second-personal” account of morality. Michael Thompson raises what I take to be a related puzzle, namely how there could be purely moral “bipolar” or directed obligations between persons, outside of any concrete practice or system of institutions. In chapter 3, I argue that these concerns all share the assumption that morality is merely one determinate mode of second-personal or bipolar normativity among others, along with, say, this or that system of law or etiquette. On the alternative picture I propose, bipolar morality *just is* the normative structure informing these concrete institutions or practices, and so the very conditions under which the form of address I called “command” is being deployed. This picture has striking implications for the relation between law and morality. Rather than (partially) constituting the circumstances to which independently determinate moral principles apply, the moral significance of law is to render otherwise indeterminate moral principles applicable *in concreto*.

My case for a relational understanding of authority is part of a larger research program on the distinction between reasons and duties. Just as Raz and others attempt to capture the distinction between theoretical and practical authority in terms of a difference in the content of the relevant reasons, philosophers often interpret the distinction between reasons and duties by reference to a distinction in their subject matter. For instance, duties are often thought to derive their supposedly greater stringency from their normatively more stringent content. On my view, the relation between reasons and duties is instead analogous to the relation between counsel and command. Whereas the normative force of reasons depends on their content, the normative force of duties derives from exercises of the will, whether our own or that of others.