Colloquium Lecture: Carol Rovane (Columbia), "Skepticism and Naturalism — and Relativism?"

Abstract:

In Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, Strawson makes clear that his making central the idea of relativization to a perspective does not rule out adopting a realist attitude towards what we know from different perspectives. He is less clear on the question whether his form of relativizing to a perspective amounts, or indeed how it even relates to, what we familiarly think of as relativism. To the extent that relativism itself is a coherent doctrine, we can try to get clearer on that question by raising four issues that I will address in this paper: First, whether Strawson is right to suppose that there are, or even can be, logical conflict between the perspectives he distinguishes, as opposed to another relation that has been associated with the history of philosophical debate about relativism, namely, alternativeness, or as it is sometimes called, incommensurability. Second, whether focusing on the latter helps to shore up Strawson’s inclination towards retaining realism together with his apparent relativism. Third, whether relativization of his sort allows us to embrace together what is known from different perspectives from a single point of view, and whether this is even a desirable outcome. Finally, whether the realism that Strawson’s nonreductive naturalism involves should be construed as a form of transcendental naturalism.