Colloquium Lecture: Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (UNC Chapel Hill) “On a Theory of a Better Morality and a Better Theory of Morality”

“On A Theory of a Better Morality and a Better Theory of Morality” (but the core argument concerns not just morality, but practical reason and theoretical reason)

Abstract: Normally, there is a sharp distinction between a better theory of X and a theory of a better X. That the theory of a better X is a theory according to which things are different from the way one’s (so far) best theory says they are is (normally) no reason whatsoever to think one’s (so far) best theory is wrong, just reason to wish X were different (and, if it is possible, reason to work to change X). That it would be better if everyone were treated as equals is no reason whatsoever to think that they are; that it would be better that death came quickly, painlessly, and late in life is no reason whatsoever to think it does; that it would be better if we could fly is no reason whatsoever to think that we can…

In contrast (I maintain) when the subject matter is morality -- and more broadly, when it is normative -- the normally sharp distinction is elided and the difference between one’s theory of the best X (the best morality, the best standards of inference, the best rules of justification…) and one’s (so far) best theory of X necessarily provides a reason (though perhaps not a decisive reason) to think one’s (so far) best theory is wrong.

The elision plays an essential role in a range of arguments concerning morality, practical rationality, and theoretical rationality, a few of which I discuss. Yet it smacks of depending crucially and unacceptably on wishful thinking – on supposing that the fact that things would be better if only they were a certain way provides some reason to think they are that way.

I argue that the elision reflects a broad and important constraint on acceptable normative theories – whether moral, practical, or theoretical -- that is itself explained by a distinctive characteristic of normative concepts that sets them all apart from descriptive concepts.