History of Philosophy Workshop: Noa Shein (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), "What's Up with 2P2?"

Abstract: One of the most striking claims in Spinoza’s Ethics is Proposition Two of Part Two: “Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.” Its proof is exceptionally brief, saying only that it follows “in the same way as that of the preceding proposition” (2P2Dem.). This is very puzzling, both because Spinoza surely anticipated his reader to resist the claim that God is extended, and because it is not obvious how it could parallel 2P1Dem. Two more general questions about the opening propositions of Part Two arise: why are Thought and Extension demonstrated only in Part Two, and given that everything must be conceived through an attribute (1P10schol), how can attributes be deduced from more basic concepts? This paper aims to explain and spell out the demonstration of 2P2, but more importantly, it will argue why Spinoza could have assumed its demonstration would be accepted with ease by a careful reader. Addressing this issue will also explain why Spinoza delays establishing the attributes of the infinite substance until Part Two and in what sense they are “demonstrated.”